Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman: A Futile Attempt to Deter Management Fraud by Gay, Cathy A.
CENCO, INC. V. SEIDMN & SEIDMAN A
FUTILE ATTEMPT TO DETER
MANAGEMENT FRAUD
Contemporary corporations suffer from unparalleled instances of
employees using their positions in the corporation for personal gain.'
Top-level managers, in particular, can use their positions in the
corporation for personal gain;2 managers can conceal large-scale frauds
more.easily than low-level employees can, because of their ability to
manipulate internal controls. 3  Not surprisingly, independent
accountants hired by a corporation frequently fail to discover such
management fraud.4
1. According to one "conservative" estimate, employee theft costs businesses approximately
$41.8 billion per year. See Kantor, How to FoilEmploye [sic] Crime, NATION'S Bus., July 1983, at
38. In fact, a business may lose as much as a third of its profits to internal theft. Id Inside theft
may also account for 30% of all business failures. Id ; see also R. HOLLINGER & J. CLARK, THEFT
BY EMPLOYEES 2-4 (1983)(employee theft increases prices by twelve cents on the dollar).
2. According to one authority, it is impossible to determine the average losses to
shareholders and others from management fraud; several cases involve losses of $100 million to
$200 million to shareholders alone. W. ALBRECHT, M. ROMNEY, D. CHERRINGTON, I. PAYNE &
A. ROE, How TO DETECT AND PREVENT BUSINESS FRAUD 24 (1982).
3. One of the "basic concepts" of auditing is that
[t]he establishment and maintenance of a system of internal control is an important re-
sponsibility of management. The basic concepts implicit in the definition of accounting
control are discussed in the context of that responsibility. The system of internal control
should be under continuing supervision by management to determine that it is function-
ing as prescribed and is modified as appropriate for changes in conditions.
1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU § 320.31 (1972).
4. Under the federal securities laws an annual audit is mandatory for most publicly held
corporations. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require
independent auditors to certify certain financial statements released by such corporations. See
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa, schedule A, items 25-27, 77sa (1982); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(l)(b)(1)(J), 78(l)(b)(1)(K), 78m(a), 78m(b) (1982).
Although auditors should be aware of the possibility of management fraud, their audits will
not necessarily discover such fraud. See 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU
§ 327.09 (1977); M. EPSTEIN & E. WEISS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ACCOUNTANTS' LEGAL
LIABILITY 14-15 (1977). Some forms of management fraud are virtually undetectable because of
the "inherent limitations" of the auditing process. See I AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
(CCH) AU § 327.11 (1977). The cost of an audit should bear a reasonable relationship to the
benefits expected to be derived from it. Id Therefore, selective testing of the data being
examined "is subject to the inherent risk that material errors or irregularities, if they exist, will not
be detected." Id
The auditor should, however, recognize that management can direct subordinates to conceal
or misrepresent information that could result in a material misstatement of the financial
statements. Id § 327.09 (1977). Because "management can perpetrate irregularities by other
employees .... the auditor should be aware of the importance of management's integrity to the
effective operation of internal accounting control procedures and should consider whether there
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When defrauding managers successfully avoid detection by
independent auditors, injured shareholders may sue the auditors for
damages caused by the management fraud.5 In such suits, the auditors
usually argue that the corporation should bear legal responsibility for
the fraud. Traditionally, courts analyzing legal responsibility for
employee fraud use principles of state contract or tort law.6 In Cenco,
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit refused to use the traditional approach to determine
are circumstances that might predispose management to misstate financial statements." Id; see
also id § 327.10 (1977)(factors to consider in determining whether management may have
overridden control mechanisms).
In addition to management override of internal controls, "[clertain acts, such as collusion...
among management. . . may result in misrepresentations being made to the auditor. .. that
appear truthful and genuine." Id § 327.12 (1977). The auditor's reliance on the truthfulness of
certain representations is reasonable. Id The auditor is "not an insurer or guarantor, if his
examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, he has fulfilled
his professional responsibility." Id § 327.13 (1977). For a discussion of a corporation's internal
accounting control system, its importance in the reliability of financial statements, and what
constitutes "reasonable assurance" that the system works, see Ad Hoc Committee on Reports by
Management, Reports by Management: 4 Discussion Paper, 36 Bus. LAW 1061, 1067-69 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1360 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508,
509 (1983); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449,457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
177 (1982). 1
6. Originally, courts expressed a reluctance to hold accountants responsible for undetected
employee fraud under any principle of law. See, e.g., City of E. Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn.
296, 299-300, 141 N.W. 181, 182 (1913)(damages too remote); National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 256
A.D. 226, 236, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1939)(although plaintiff established a prima facie case of
negligence, the jury determines whether the accountants could have anticipated losses incurred
after their audit); Craig v. Anyon, 212 A.D. 55, 64-65, 208 N.Y.S. 259, 267-68 (contributory
negligence a defense and damages too remote), aft'd without opinion, 242 N.Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431
(1925); O'Neill v. Atlas Auto. Fin. Corp., 139 Pa. Super. 346, 350, 11 A.2d 782, 784
(1940)(accountants' examination is a limited contractual undertaking and therefore no liability for
failure to discover embezzlement). Concern that the potential damages would be prohibitive has
caused most of this reluctance. See M. EPSTEIN & E. WEIss, supra note 4, at 12, 22. Accordingly,
some of the earlier decisions insisted on an action for breach of contract rather than in tort,
because of the assumption that damages would be more restrictive in the former cause of action.
See, e.g., Steele, 121 Minn. at 300, 141 N.W. at 182;Anyon, 212 A.D. at 66, 208 N.Y.S. at 268; see
also Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of PublicAccountants, 12 VAN D. L. REV. 797, 800
(1959). Courts eventually recognized that accountants are commonly hired for the very purpose
of detecting employee fraud, see, e.g., National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 A.D. 226, 235-36, 9
N.Y.S.2d 554, 562-63 (1939), and consequently now allow recovery for breach of contract or in
tort for negligent action. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook, 35 F. Supp. 160, 165 (E.D. Mich.
1940); Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Gas Co., 115 Fla. 541, 548, 156 So. 116, 118
(1934); Lybrand, 256 A.D. at 234-36, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 561-63. These alternative bases for recovery
reflect the corporation's expectation that the audit will be performed with reasonable care and
competence and in accordance with professional standards, see Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245
Minn. 249, 250-51, 72 N.W.2d 364, 367-68 (1955); Katsoris,.4ccountants' Third Party Liability-
How Far Do We Go?, 36 FoRDHAm L. REv. 191, 192 (1967), as well as the contractual origin of
the employment relationship, see Southern Methodist Univ. v. United States, 645 F.2d 893, 900
(Ct. Cl. 1981).
7. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982).
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accountant liability for management fraud that was not discovered by
an audit. Instead, the court's opinion, written by Judge Posner, utilized
"economic analysis" to determine the appropriate law.8
This note examines the effectiveness of the Cenco court's attempt
to reach an economically efficient result. The note begins by presenting
the facts and the court's reasoning in Cenco.9 It then analyzes the
deficiencies in the court's analysis.10 The note concludes that the
holding in Cenco will not deter management fraud, primarily because
it fails to take into account the propriety of the auditor's actions."
I. CENCO, INC. V SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN: MANAGEMENT FRAUD AS
AN ACCOUNTANT'S DEFENSE
In Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld a jury instruction that permitted accountants to
allege management fraud as a defense to a claim against the account-
ants by the corporation that employed the managers.' 2 The court's
opinion disregarded distinctions between traditional contract and tort
law.13 Instead, Judge Posner focused on compensating the true victims
8. Although Judge Posner did not originate economic analysis of legal issues, he has become
"its greatest popularizer and most vigorous proponent." Warren, Richard Posner Shakes up the
Bench, AM. LAW., Sept. 1983, at 75-76; see also Schmalbeck, The Justice of Economics. An
Analysis of Wealth Maximization as a Normative Goal, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 488, 524 n.133 (1983)(f
others "may be said to have put economic analysis of the law on the map, Posner may be said to
have built the super-highway connecting it with every major area of law"). For earlier proponents
of economic analysis, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
9. See infra notes 12-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44-77 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
12. 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982).
13. The accountants in Cenco were sued for breach of contract, professional malpractice
(negligence), and fraud. 686 F.2d at 453. Judge Posner combined the three legal theories into one
analysis. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
As Judge Posner implies, the formal distinctions between contract and tort analysis of ac-
countant liability seem trivial. When an accountant performs an audit improperly, it essentially
breaches its auditing contract and commits a negligent tort.
Under a traditional contract analysis, courts would search the terms of the accountant's em-
ployment contract to decide whether the parties contemplated accountant responsibility. See, e.g.,
Southern Methodist Univ. v. United States, 645 F.2d 893, 900 (Ct. Cl. 1981); City of E. Grand
Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 299, 141 N.W. 181, 182 (1913); National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand,
256 A.D. 226, 234, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1939). See generally Katsoris, supra note 6, at 197-98
(general discussion of accountants' contractual undertakings). Although the auditor and its client
bargain at arms length, terms such as use of professional skill and care will be implied if not
expressly included in the contract. See Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 253-54, 72
N.W.2d 364, 367; Katsoris, supra note 6, at 192.
The analysis employed by courts as a basis for implying terms in the traditional contract
parallels the standards found in the traditional tort analysis. Specifically, auditors have a "duty"
to perform with the skill and diligence of a reasonably prudent professional accountant. See
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of the fraud and on deterring future wrongdoing.' 4
Seidman & Seidman is an independent auditing firm that was
hired by Cenco. Cenco is a publicly held corporation that sold, among
other things, medical supplies. Seidman's audit did not uncover a
fraud perpetrated by several of Cenco's managers.' 5 These managers
had fraudulently inflated inventories, enabling the company to main-
tain an artificially high stock price, to borrow at lower interest rates, to
recover inflated insurance claims on lost or stolen inventory, and to buy
up other companies "on the cheap."'16
After a newly-hired financial officer at Cenco discovered the fraud,
thousands of its stockholders filed a federal class action' 7 against
Cenco, its corrupt managers, and Seidman. 8 Seidman and Cenco filed
cross-claims against each other for indemnification of losses.' 9 Al-
though both Seidman and Cenco settled with the class prior to litiga-
tion,20 the case proceeded to trial for resolution of the cross-claims.
The trial judge dismissed Seidman's cross-claim for damages
Katsoris, supra note 6, at 192. This duty requires "more than a rubber stamp for management."
Bradley, Auditors' Liability and the Needfor Increased Accounting Uniformity, 30 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 898, 922 (1965); see also Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540
F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1976)(accountants must do more than verify the mathematical correctness of
the bookkeeper's addition and subtraction).
Thus, under either theory the auditor has the same basic obligation. One important distinc-
tion is that third parties (those not a party to the contract) can sue in tort. See, e.g., Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C.
629, 670 (1957); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20, 25 (Sup. Ct.), aJ'd without
opinion, 285 A.D. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955). See generally Sonde, The Responsibility of Profes-
sionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 3 (1973).
Allegations of fraud raise a distinction-culpability--that places analysis of that theory be-
yond the scope of this note. Judge Posner discussed this distinction only briefly, probably because
"evidence that Seidman had knowledge of the fraud was inconclusive." In re Cenco, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 519 F. Supp. 322, 327 (N.D. Il. 1981).
14. A subsequent decision by the Seventh Circuit addressed this emphasis on compensation
and deterrence, but distinguished Cenco and limited its application. See Schacht v. Brown, 711
F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983); infra notes 58-67 and accom-
panying text.
15. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 451.
16. Id The fraud involved the Cenco Medical Health/Supply Corporation, a subsidiary in
Cenco's Health Care Group. In re Seidman & Seidman, SEC Accounting Release No. 196, [1937-
1982 Transfer Binder Accounting Series Releases] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 72,218, at 62,521
(Sept. 1, 1976). Employees in this division inflated the value and extent of inventories by altering
the quantities of inventory recorded on two-part, prenumbered inventory tags and the correspond-
ing computer listings, and by creating new inventory tags to reflect the nonexistent inventory, Id
17. The class consisted of the approximately 20,000-25,000 persons, Helfand v. Cenco, Inc.,
80 F.R.D. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1977), who had purchased Cenco stock during a five-year span, Cenco,
686 F.2d at 455.
18. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 451.
19. Id
20. Seidman and Cenco paid $3.5 million and $11 million, respectively, to the shareholder
class. Id at 451, 459.
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against Cenco by issuing a directed verdict for Cenco on the claim.21
The judge submitted Cenco's cross-claims against Seidman to the
jury,22 instructing that Seidman was entitled to assert the fraud of
Cenco's managers as a defense against Cenco's charges of breach of
contract, professional malpractice, and fraud.23 The jury found for
Seidman on each of Cenco's claims.24
Cenco appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.25
Judge Posner, writing for a unanimous panel, could find no authorita-
tive statement of Illinois (the relevant state) law,26 and therefore ap-
plied his own interpretation of applicable common law standards.2 7
Judge Posner first combined the legal principles of breach of contract,
malpractice, and fraud into one analysis: "Despite the plurality of
charges it is one question because [all of these causes of action], when
committed by auditors, are a single form of wrongdoing under different
names. '28 Similarly, Judge Posner treated "the defenses based on mis-
conduct of the audited firm or its employees. . . alike, though verbal-
ized differently." 29
In short, Judge Posner's Cenco opinion ignored traditional distinc-
tions between common law causes of action and applied principles of
deterrence and compensation to analyze accountant liability for undis-
covered fraud. He used a two-pronged analysis to determine whether
the managers' fraud should be imputed to the corporation.30 First, he
asked "whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation would
21. Id at 451-52.
22. Id at 452.
23. Id at 454.
24. Id at 452.
25. Both sides appealed certain rulings. Id at 452. In addition, Cenco appealed from the
judgment against it (based on a jury verdict) and from the dismissal of two counts in its cross-
claim. Id Seidman also appealed from the dismissal of its cross-claim. Id
26. Judge Posner has been criticized for "flagrantly skirt[ing] precedent and unjustifiably im-
pos[ing] free-market and economic-efficiency tests." See Warren, supra note 8, at 76.
27. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 452-53. The federal court had jurisdiction over Cenco's cross-claims,
which were based on state law, through its ancillary jurisdiction. Id The class action was prop-
erly brought in federal court, id at 451, and the settlement was not approved until after the trial
on the cross-claims had begun. Id at 452. Thus, although the issue had not been addressed by
the Illinois courts, Judge Posner based his holding solely on an interpretation of Illinois state law.
See id at 454.
28. Id at 453.
29. Id Judge Posner observed that "breach of contract is excused if the promisee's hin-
drance or failure to cooperate prevented the promisor from performing the contract." Id. Such
conduct, according to Judge Posner, can also be viewed as contributory negligence. Id He also
explained that "a participant in a fraud cannot also be a victim entitled to recover damages, for he
cannot have relied on the truth of the fraudulent representations." Id at 454.
30. The Cenco court's analysis is explained in Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983). For more detailed discussions of Schacht, see infra
notes 58-67, 77 and accompanying text.
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properly compensate the victims of the wrongdoing." 31 Second, he ex-
amined "whether such recovery would deter future wrongdoing." 32
A. Deterring Management Fraud.
Judge Posner mentioned at least four factors that led him to con-
clude that allowing the auditors to assert the management fraud as a
defense would deter such fraud. He briefly mentioned two of these
factors: evidence that the innocent managers and shareholders of
Cenco negligently failed to oversee internal control measures,33 and ev-
idence that the auditors "diligently attempted to follow up all signs of
fraud but had been thwarted" by the fraudulent managers. 34 By al-
lowing Seidman to assert this defense, Judge Posner apparently in-
tended to deter further management fraud by placing a burden on
"innocent" managers and large groups of shareholders to exercise some
supervision over internal controls rather than relying solely on an in-
dependent auditor to uncover management fraud. Judge Posner also
apparently reasoned that because the auditors "diligently attempted" to
trace signs of fraud, forbidding them from asserting the defense would
not promote deterrence of management fraud; a law that protects negli-
gent managers while it penalizes diligent auditors would not deter
management fraud.
Judge Posner also noted that the fraud in Cenco "permeate[d] the
top management of the company."3 5 He distinguished this type of
fraud from that of "lowly" employees. 36 He apparently reasoned that
deterrence objectives concerning low-level fraud might not be served
31. Id (emphasis added).
32. Id (emphasis added).
33. Judge Posner reasoned that
the honest owners, and their delegates-a board of directors on which dishonesty and
carelessness were well represented-were slipshod in their oversight and so share respon-
sibility for the fraud that Seidman also failed to detect. In addition, the scale of the
fraud-the number and high rank of the managers involved-both complicated the task
of discovery for Seidman and makes the failure of oversight by Cenco's shareholders and
board of directors harder to condone.
Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456.
34. Id at 452. This reasoning reflects the majority position that auditors are insulated from
absolute liability for failure to detect management fraud; audits are not specifically or primarily
designed to uncover employee fraud. See I AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU
§ 327.09 (1977). In Judge Posner's more flowery prose, "fa]uditors are not detectives hired to
ferret out fraud, but if they chance on signs of fraud they may not avert their eyes-they must
investigate." Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454.
35. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454.
36. Id at 456. Judge Posner refused "to predict that the Illinois courts would hold that in
any action by a corporation against its auditors an employee's fraud intended to benefit the com-
pany rather than the employee at the company's expense will be attributed to the corporation,
however lowly the employee." Id
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by holding the corporation responsible for extensive oversight of low-
level employees.37
Finally, Judge Posner emphasized that deterrence of management
fraud would be furthered by holding the company responsible for over-
sight of managers only when the fraud beneted the company. He de-
scribed "company benefiting fraud" as fraudulent activity for which
outsiders to the corporation bear the primary costs, while the share-
holders of the corporation are the "beneficiaries" of the fraud.38 Thus,
because, in Judge Posner's view, the corporation was a beneficiary of
the fraud, placing legal responsibility on it would deter corporations
from purposely engaging in such fraud by offsetting the potential bene-
fit to the corporation.
B. Compensating Victims.
As mentioned above, Judge Posner sought to assure that only the
victims of the fraud would receive any damage awards. He noted, for
example, that cases such as Cenco contain an inherent "potential mis-
match between the recovery of damages by a corporation and the com-
pensation of the shareholders actually injured by the wrong for which
the damages were awarded. ' 39 In this case, however, he decided that
the "mismatch" would be too great if Cenco could overcome Seidman's
defense; a separate recovery for Cenco against its auditor would have
unfairly compensated shareholders, who had already recovered dam-
ages from both the auditor and the corporation through the class action
settlement, and would also have compensated any corrupt managers
who were still stockholders.4°
After examining these deterrence and compensation considera-
tions, Judge Posner concluded that Cenco could not "shift the entire
cost of the fraud. . . to the independent auditor who failed to prevent
the fraud."41 He reasoned that "if the owners of the corrupt enterprise
are allowed to shift the costs of its wrongdoing entirely to the auditor,
their incentives to hire honest managers and monitor their behavior
37. On the other hand, it may be that employees "tend to accept the values of their company
superiors. ... [F]raud is perpetrated and the incentive to commit fraud is created in a climate of
'moral decay' that filters down from the top and permeates middle management." W. ALBRECHT,
M. ROMNEY, D. CHERRINGTON, I. PAYNE & A. RoE, How To DETECT AND PREVENT BusINEss
FRAUD 152 (1982)(citing Cenco Corporation as an example of the influence of dishonest
management).
38. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456.
39. Id at 455; see also infra note 71 and accompanying text.
40. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455.
41. Id
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will be reduced. '42 Accordingly, Judge Posner decided to impose lia-
bility on the "owners of the corrupt enterprise" rather than on the audi-
tor, even though the auditor could have been "more diligent and
honest."43
II. RETHINKING CENCO's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Judge Posner's basic approach in Cenco appears to be correct; few
would dispute the importance of deterring management fraud or of
compensating only the victims of such fraud. Unfortunately, the opin-
ion fails adequately to address many arguments, and it indulges in con-
clusory reasoning that does not withstand detailed analysis. Although
Judge Posner's basic approach may be sound,44 two of the four factors
42. Id Judge Posner ignored the other incentives to hire honest managers. In his book Eco-
nomic Analysis ofLaw, Judge Posner discusses shareholder incentives to monitor management
behavior. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 302-04 (2d ed. 1977). He suggests that profit
maximization is the primary incentive for shareholders to monitor management. Id at 303.
Moreover, conflicts of interest between management and shareholders usually cause the latter to
insist upon protective features in the corporate charter. Id at 302.
According to Judge Posner, the price of the firm's common stock will fall when management
disregards the interests of shareholders, which will then result in exploitation by "alert investors"
with the knowledge that the stock is underpriced. Id at 303. The methods of ousting manage-
ment--the tender offer, the proxy fight, and voluntary acquisition-demonstrate the difficulty of
shareholder action in instances of mismanagement. See id at 304. The problem with these ave-
nues of shareholder control is noted by Judge Posner himself: "for most shareholders the oppor-
tunity costs of active participation in the management of the firm would be prohibitively high."
Id at 303.
Thus, shareholders have a pecuniary interest in preventing all forms of mismanagement, in-
cluding fraud. Although fraud may temporarily benefit the corporation, the cost of mismanage-
ment is ultimately "borne by the original shareholders in the form of a dilution of their interest."
See id at 302.
In addition, there are shareholders who, for either moral or ethical reasons, desire to have
honest managers because they do not wish to be associated with a dishonest corporation. Many
shareholders believe that a corporation has social responsibilities apart from the goal of profit
maximization. See id at 310-11.
43. Id
44. For example, the distinction between upper- and lower-echelon employees may be a le-
gitimate one. As one moves down the operational scale of responsibility in a typical corporation,
employees naturally divide into functional subgroups with "subgoals." Stone, Social Control of
Corporate Behavior, in CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY Socia-Y 243, 252 (M.D. Ermann & R. Lundman eds,
1978). The tasks of the smaller groups are more likely to be specific, with minimal emphasis on
"corporate profit" in the abstract. Id.
The internal flow of information normally operates to prevent evidence of wrongdoing from
reaching top management. Id at 253. Moreover, even if information reaches the management
level, it is often effectively "screened." Id Bad news often does not reach the top because em-
ployees are concerned, to varying degrees, with either displeasing or tarnishing the reputation of
the corporation's management. Id
It follows that auditors would be expected to discover financial fraud by lower echelon em-
ployees; otherwise, the information may never reach management, the individuals who are in the
best position to correct the situation. See id It is a different situation, however, when manage-
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that he considered when analyzing deterrence-the duty to monitor
and "beneficial" fraud-seem to support a contrary result in Cenco.
Moreover, Judge Posner's "compensation analysis" is unconvincing.
A. The Duty to Monitor.
Judge Posner's assertion that the innocent managers and the large
group of shareholders improperly failed to monitor the guilty managers
contains at least two flaws. Judge Posner reveals one of these flaws in
his book, Economic Analysis of the Law:
The typical shareholder (except ... where one shareholder owns a
very large percentage of the shares... ) is not knowledgeable...
and neither expects nor has an incentive to participate in the man-
agement of the firm. He is a passive investor and, because of the
liquidity of his interest, has only a casual and frequently quite transi-
tory relationship with the firm. His interest like that of a creditor is a
financial rather than managerial interest. In a technical sense the
shareholders "own" the corporation but they do not own it in the
same sense in which they own their own automobiles; it would be
better to speak of their owning the common stock of the
corporation.45
Given this statement, one is surprised to find the following language in
Cenco: "Cenco's owners-the stockholders-hired managers. . . who
turned out to be thoroughly corrupt. . . . [I]f the owners of the corrupt
enterprise are allowed to shift the costs of its wrongdoing entirely to the
auditor, their incentives to hire honest managers and monitor their be-
havior will be reduced." 46
Surprisingly, then, the "passive owners" of Cenco suddenly ac-
quire a duty to actively monitor the management-an activity in which
ment participates or acquiesces in fraudulent conduct. Then, those who should oversee the behav-
ior of others are placed in a position of policing their own fraudulent conduct.
A corollary concern is that threats to the corporate treasury do not necessarily constrain key
personnel from engaging in illegal or fraudulent behavior. See id at 254. There is "no reason
blithely to suppose that a threat reasonably calculated to make lawbreaking a poor bargain for
'the corporation' will change management's calculations in the direction society desires." Id at
258. To the extent, however, that
the most influential managers of the corporation are not just salaried, but also holders of
common shares, or of option plans to purchase shares, their personal calculations fall
more in line with those of the shareholders. Even then, however, it does not follow that
there is a "unity" of their interests and the interests of "the corporation" (referring to
some mix of interest of common shareholders, creditors, employees and bondholders).
Id at 256.
45. R. POSNER, supra note 42, at 301.
46. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455 (emphasis added). Judge Posner continues:
While it is true that in a publicly held corporation such as Cenco most shareholders do
not have a large enough stake to play an active role in hiring and supervising managers,
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they have no "incentive to participate." This interpretation of the
shareholders' monitoring responsibilities, however, is less reasonable
than Judge Posner's earlier analysis in his book. Expecting passive
shareholders to monitor corporate managers to the extent necessary to
uncover management fraud is unrealistic.
Even if the innocent managers and shareholders have a duty to
monitor corrupt managers, the duty should be met when the corpora-
tion hires independent accountants to conduct an audit. These auditors
are not expected to "ferret out fraud," but conformance to Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS)47 does require "proper study
47. Generally accepted auditing standards define the level of quality of the auditing proce-
dures. One of the standards requires the auditor's report to state whether the financial statements
were performed according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). See Fiflas, Cur-
rent Problems of Accountants" Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REv. 31, 40 (1975).
"Generally accepted" is somewhat misleading when used to describe accounting principles be-
cause customary practices are only one category of GAAP. GAAP also includes dependable busi-
ness practices, views of regulatory agencies (especially the SEC), bankers, and stock exchanges,
academic opinions, and opinions of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA). Id at 41.
Auditing procedures, unlike auditing standards, vary from one set of circumstances to an-
other. Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liabilityfor Defective Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGS L.J.
436, 438 (1964).
The Standards of Field Work, as established by the AICPA, provide in part:
[1] ... The examination is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate
technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
[2] In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be
maintained by the auditor or auditors.
[3] Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the examination and
the preparation of the report.
I AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AU §§ 210.01, 220.01, 230.01 (1972).
Standards of Field Work are:
[1] ... The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly
supervised.
[2] There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control as a basis
for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant extent of the tests to which
auditing procedures are to be restricted.
[3] Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, observa-
tion, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding
the financial statements under examination.
Id §§ 311.01 (1978), 320.01 (1972), 326.01 (1980).
Standards of Reporting include:
[1] ... The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in accord-
ance with generall, accepted accounting princoples.
[2] The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently observed in the
current period in relation to the preceding period.
[3] Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as reasonably
adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
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and evaluation of... existing internal control. ' 48 Thus, an independ-
ent auditor serves any supervisory function that could be expected of
the "passive owners" of a publicly held corporation.49
Moreover, the duty Judge Posner would impose would create inef-
ficiency. First, Judge Posner would apparently require shareholders
with as little as five percent of a company's stock to hire their own
auditors.50 Second, he would apparently require groups of sharehold-
ers and innocent managers to do more than hire their own independent
auditors: "large" shareholders must adopt measures in addition to au-
[41 The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the financial state-
ments, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be expressed.
When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, the reasons therefor should be stated. In
all cases where an auditor's name is associated with financial statements, the report
should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's examination, if
any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.
Id §§ 410.01 (1972), 420.01 (1972), 431.01 (1980), 504.01 (1979)(emphasis added).
48. See id § 327.09 (1977). The audit is intended to close the credibility gap that would
result if there were no independent investigation of the financial statement prepared by corporate
management. See id §§ 110.01, 110.02, 220.01, 220.02, 220.03, 220.04, 220.07 (1972). The objec-
tive of the audit is to express an opinion on whether a corporation's financial statements fairly
represent its financial condition and operating results. Id § 110.01 (1972). The information in the
financial statements and accounts reflect matters within the knowledge and control of manage-
ment. Id § 110.02 (1972). Management is responsible "for adopting sound accounting policies,
for maintaining an adequate and effective system of accounts for the safeguarding of assets, and
for devising a system of internal control that will, among other things, help assure the production
of proper financial statements." Id
The auditor must be independent of management, id § 220.02 (1972), and must conduct a
study and evaluation of internal control, id § 320.01 (1972). Internal control is examined to deter-
mine the extent to which the information supplied can be relied upon in determining the nature,
extent, and timing of the audit tests to be utilized in the examination of the financial statements.
Id § 320.06 (1972); see also supra note 4 (discussion of management's manipulation of internal
controls).
49. In fact, investors are not in a position to monitor or supervise management's actions:
The control of [a] firm resides in a management group. . . [consisting] of people who
are experienced in the business and involved in it on a full-time, day-to-day basis. The
typical shareholder... is not knowledgeable about the business of the firm, does not
derive an important part of his livelihood from it, and neither expects nor has an incen-
tive to participate in the management of the firm .... His interest like that of a creditor
is a financial rather than managerial interest.
R. POSNER, supra note 42, at 301. According to Judge Posner, shareholders own "their" corpora-
tion only in a technical sense: "they do not own it in the same sense in which they own their
automobiles; it would be better to speak of their owning the common stock of the corporation."
Id. Furthermore, Judge Posner does not find it anomalous that shareholders do not manage or
control "their" corporation. Id
Because shareholders neither monitor nor manage a corporation effectively, the audit has
come to serve an increasingly important function for shareholders, creditors, and others. For a
discussion of the evolution of the audit function "from a mere watchdog for management to an
independent evaluation of the adequacy and fairness of financial statements issued by manage-
ment" to third parties, see Comment, Auditors' Responsibilityfor Misrepresentation: Inadequate
Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. Rav. 139, 178 (1968).
50. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456.
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dits to monitor the corporation's management.5' Moreover, each group
of shareholders and each manager would be making similar, and there-
fore duplicative, examinations of management.
B. The Beneficial Fraud Distinction.
Judge Posner also justified his result in Cenco by arguing that de-
terrence of beneficial fraud-as opposed to detrimental fraud-would
be achieved more efficiently by imposing liability on the corporation.
He appeared to define beneficial fraud as fraud for which "the primary
costs . . . are borne not by the stockholders but by outsiders to the
corporation. '5 2 Thus, according to Judge Posner, deterrence of such
fraud must be achieved in a different fashion than deterrence of detri-
mental fraud-fraud in which the corporation bears the primary
costs. 53 The beneficial/detrimental distinction is not sound given
Cenco's emphasis on deterrence; the distinction has no relevance-and
Judge Posner supplies none-to affecting the behavior of either the
fraudulent managers, the innocent managers, or the shareholders 5 4
The fraudulent managers are not affected by a distinction based on
which party-the corporation or the auditor-bears the primary cost of
the fraud. Any costs imposed on a corporation by detrimental fraud
that are absent in instances of beneficial fraud will not affect managers'
behavior; the corporation, not the managers, absorbs such costs. More-
51. Curtis-Wright Corporation, which owned 5% to 16% of Cenco's common stock while the
fraud was being committed, had its own accounting firm conduct "a study of Cenco's operations."
Id These auditors also failed to uncover the fraud. Id
52. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456.
53. Id "Detrimental" fraud would occur, for example, if the managers of a corporation sold
a secret trade formula to competitors. Even if the sale went undetected for a period of time, the
corporation would bear the primary cost. Moreover, even if damages were recovered and criminal
sanctions imposed, nothing could replace the loss of prestige and exclusivity enjoyed by the
corporation.
54. In fact, it is unclear whether any fraud ultimately benefits a corporation. Even Judge
Posner admitted that Cenco may not be a "net beneficiary" of the fraud "after the fraud is un-
masked and the corporation is sued." Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456. He avoided the issue by stating:
"that is a question of damages, and is not before us." Id Nevertheless, Cenco had already con-
tributed $11 million to the settlement, id at 459, and had undoubtedly suffered loss of goodwill
because of the suit's effect on its reputation. As a passage by Posner suggests, shareholders ulti-
mately bear the loss of a management fraud:
The danger of mismanagement is less serious than the danger that the managers will not
deal fairly with the shareholders. Mismanagement will lead eventually to the bankruptcy
of the firm.... The managers thus have a strong incentive to manage the firm well or,
if they are unable to manage it well themselves, to sell their offices to those who can. The
incentive to deal fairly with shareholders is weaker. To be sure, managers who do not
deal fair!Y with the shareholders will have to pay a premium should they ever want to
raise additional capital.... But the cost of the premium will not be borne by the man-
agers; it will be borne by the original shareholders in the form of a dilution of their
interest. There is thus [a] potential conflict of interest ....
R. POSNER, supra note 42, at 302.
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over, the innocent managers and shareholders will not be encouraged
to adopt monitoring measures designed sole,y to detect beneficial fraud;
designing such measures would be impractical, if not impossible.55
The steps that would have been necessary to detect the fraud in
Cenco illustrate this point. Cenco's guilty managers inflated the inven-
tory figures.56 To detect this inflation, Cenco needed internal controls
that monitored inventories more closely than did the controls used at
the time of the fraud. Specifically, it needed controls that monitored
the personnel in charge of inventory.5 7 Such controls would undoubt-
edly be designed to detect both inventory undervaluation and theft, as
well as inventory inflation. Only after the fraud had been detected
would Cenco have known whether it was beneficial or detrimental. In
short, given Judge Posner's desire to deter management fraud before it
occurs, focusing on "beneficial fraud" is not helpful.
A subsequent opinion by the Seventh Circuit, Schacht v. Brown,58
accentuates the difficulty in distinguishing between detrimental and
beneficial fraud. In Schacht, accountants and managers concealed the
fact that a corporation was insolvent.5 9 This allowed the corporation to
remain active; the state would have forbidden the corporation from
writing insurance-its primary business activity-if it had known of
the insolvency.6 Because the corporation remained active, its custom-
ers, creditors, and even its parent corporation suffered damage. 61
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that did
55. The difficulties of developing such monitoring measures become apparent after an exami-
nation of Cenco's procedures. See In re Seidman & Seidman, SEC Accounting Release No. 196,
[1937-1982 Transfer Binder Accounting Series Releases] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,218, at
62,520 (Sept. 1, 1976); see also supra note 16; infra note 56.
56. The managers inflated inventories by overstating the number of items in the inventory.
Cenco's personnel used two-part tags when calculating inventory tags. Id at 62,521. Used, un-
used, and voided tags were processed onto computer cards from which the inventory lists were
made. Id But Cenco personnel reported nonexistent inventory. See id at 62,522-23.
These inflated inventories accounted for 34% of Cenco's total assets in 1974. Id at 62,523.
And of the $39 million in assets reported by Cenco Medical Health/Supply Corporation, about
50% of it was nonexistent. Id
57. See supra notes 55-56.
58. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983).
59. In Schacht a statutory liquidator charged, inter alia, that accountants knew of the insol-
vency of an insurance company, but prepared unqualified opinion letters on the company's
financial statements. 711 F.2d at 1345. The parent corporation of the insurance company "laun-
dered" the latter's insufficient surplus by funneling some of its high-risk insurance business to
another subsidiary. Id
60. The Illinois Department of Insurance failed to discover the insolvent subsidiary's inade-
quate supplies and approved the company's continuation provided certain surplus requirements
were met. Id
61. See id at 1350.
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not include Judge Posner 62 explained why Cenco did not apply to
Schacht. Judge Wood, who also sat on the Cenco panel and who wrote
the opinion in Schacht, focused on the "beneficial fraud" factor.63 But
the Schacht court adopted the approach rejected by Posner in Cenco; it
focused on whether the corporation was a "net beneficiary" of the
fraud. Finding that the fraud was not beneficial to the corporation, the
court reasoned that "the fact that. . .[the corporation's] existence may
have been artificially prolonged pales in comparison with the real dam-
age allegedly inflicted by the diminution of its assets and income. '64
The court's approach in Schacht contradicts and ignores Judge
Posner's reasoning in Cenco. As mentioned above, Judge Posner fo-
cused on whether third parties or the corporation incurred the initial
primary costs of the fraud; he was unwilling to look at the long-term
"real damage" to the corporation.65 Under the reasoning in Cenco,
Judge Posner would have found the fraud in Schacht to be beneficial to
the corporation, a pivotal factor militating in favor of allowing the au-
ditor's defense in Cenco.66 These divergent results are not as important
as the ramifications Schacht has on the validity of distinguishing be-
tween beneficial and detrimental fraud.67 Judge Wood's failure to ana-
lyze beneficial fraud in the same manner as Judge Posner's Cenco
opinion, an opinion in which Judge Wood joined, underscores the irrel-
evance of any beneficial/detrimental distinction.
62. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Cummings, Judge Wood, and Judge Walter Hoff-
man, Senior District Judge of the Eastern District of Virginia, who sat by designation. Id at 1344.
Judge Wood wrote the opinion.
63. The Schacht court essentially limited Cenco's holding to its facts. It reasoned that the
defense of management fraud could not be invoked unless the fraud benefited the client. Id at
1347-48. In other words, Cenco's holding does not apply when the client is a victim, rather than a
beneficiary, of the fraud.
64. Id at 1348.
65. See sulpra note 38 and accompanying text.
66. In Schacht, the fraudulent scheme had the effect of extending the corporation's existence
beyond the point of insolvency. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1348. As the court in Schacht points
out, however, "the fact that [the corporation's] existence may have been artificially prolonged
pales in comparison with the real damage allegedly inflicted by the diminution of its assets and
income." Id Apparently, the prolongation benefited the managers and the other alleged conspir-
ators, but not the corporation. Id
The court in Schacht takes the step that Judge Posner declined to consider in Cenco: evaluat-
ing the "net" effect of the fraud. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456. Under the Cenco analysis, those
who prolonged the life of the corporation in Schacht would be committing fraud "on behalf of'
the corporation, see id, and, therefore, the corporation would benefit from the fraud.
67. The court's failure to extend Cenco to the facts of Schacht is of some significance; it could
have decided to extend use of the Cenco defense to factual contexts not involving "beneficial
fraud." The court admitted, for example, that it was writing "on a clean slate." Schacht, 711 F.2d
at 1347. It could have therefore adopted Judge Posner's reasoning in Schacht; Judge Posner had




C. The Compensation Analysis in Cenco.
Judge Posner also based his holding in Cenco on his belief that a
judgment for Cenco would be "perverse from the standpoint of com-
pensating victims of the wrongdoing." 68 The judgment would be "per-
verse" because the corrupt managers and undeserving shareholders
would be improperly compensated.6 9 As with the distinction between
beneficial and detrimental fraud,70 however, the Cenco opinion and the
Schacht opinion illustrate the immateriality of this factor.
Assuring that damage awards to corporations reach deserving
shareholders is a constant problem because of the transitory nature of
stock ownership.71 Cenco shareholders at the time of the decision, for
example, may have included speculators who bought the stock antici-
pating a recovery from Seidman. Such speculating shareholders un-
doubtedly abound, and they are frequently compensated
notwithstanding the fact that they were not true victims of the damage
to the corporation.
Moreover, if the goal of not compensating the guilty managers or
the shareholders who have already recovered is of paramount impor-
tance, a court could structure its remedy to preclude such compensa-
tion.72 Judge Posner could, for example, have constructed a remedy in
equity that specifically precluded damage payments to any guilty man-
agers owning Cenco stock and any shareholders who had recovered
through the settlement. But he did not even mention evidence that any
of the alleged "improper compensation" would occur. Instead, he
merely stated that "[t]o the extent that [the corrupt managers] are still
stockholders in the company, they would benefit pro rata from a judg-
ment in favor of Cenco. '' 73 By basing his decision on such hypothetical
evidence of potential mismatched compensation, Judge Posner detracts
from deterrence of management fraud-the goal he vehemently pur-
sues in the rest of the opinion.74
68. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455.
69. See supra notes 31, 39-40 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
71. For example, in a class action derivative suit, the court approved portions of a settlement
to recover illegal corporate campaign donations in 1978, six years after the donations were made,
and three years after the suit was instituted. See Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 135-39 (3d Cir.
1978). Although recoveries in derivative suits are sought for the benefit of the corporation, see id
at 147, shareholders of record benefit indirectly, see id at 148. In most corporations the share-
holders of record fluctuate constantly.
72. Courts considering derivative actions brought by minority shareholders have constructed
remedies to fit the circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
73. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455.
74. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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Altering Cenco's facts illustrates this point. Instead of assuming
that Seidman audited Cenco diligently, assume, as the SEC eventually
found,75 that Seidman did not follow GAAS during its audit. If it
could be demonstrated that the fraud would have been discovered but
for Seidman's negligence, it would be difficult to absolve Seidman of
liability, notwithstanding the "potential mismatch between the recov-
ery of damages by a corporation and the compensation of the share-
holders actually injured by the wrong for which the damages were
awarded. '76 Emphasizing "mismatches" in compensation awards
serves little purpose in cases in which a corporation recovers damages;
the remedy can always be structured to avoid truly "perverse"
compensation.
Dictum in Schacht provides a final illustration of the flaws in em-
phasizing potential "perverse" compensation. In Schacht the court rea-
soned that, in contrast to Cenco, "the other actions noted to this court
based on these alleged events have yet to result in any recovery. '77
This reasoning implies that the results of a case like Cenco could de-
pend entirely and fortuitously on which of several claims is resolved
first, an unreliable and unacceptable way to render a principled
decision.
III. CONCLUSION
In Cenco, Judge Posner purported to promulgate a doctrine that
would deter management fraud. To be of any value, Judge Posner's
doctrine should deter improper actions taken by at least one of three
parties: large shareholders, the innocent managers, or the auditor. Un-
fortunately, the factors that he found determinative have minimal prac-
tical relevance to such deterrence.
First, distinguishing fraud that "benefits" the corporation in its ini-
tial stages has little deterrent effect on any party. Second, any problems
with unwarranted compensation can be easily avoided by tailoring the
75. See In re Seidman & Seidman, SEC Accounting Release No. 196, [1937-1982 Transfer
Binder Accounting Series Releases] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,218, at 62,520 (Sept. 1, 1976).
76. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455.
77. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1349. The Schacht court supplied another reason:
any recovery by the Director from the instant suit will inure to Reserve's estate. And
under the distribution provisions of the governing liquidation statute, it is the policy-
holders and creditors who have first claim.... Thus, the claims of these entirely inno-
cent parties must be satisfied in full before Reserve's shareholders, last in line for
recovery, receive anything.
Id at 1348. The court admitted, however, that it could not "speculate on the existence or relative
size of any recovery to Reserve's shareholders." Id at 1349 n.5. Because the fraud was extensive
and lasted approximately five years, prior claims may exhaust the estate before the shareholders
are allowed to participate in the recovery.
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remedy to preclude such compensation. Arguably, placing responsibil-
ity on the corporation for some undetected management fraud may
provide shareholders and managers with an incentive to escalate moni-
toring of management, but primary responsibility for such monitoring
must remain with the auditors.
Surprisingly, however, Judge Posner did not scrutinize closely the
auditor's actions in Cenco. Judge Posner's opinion inconsistently de-
scribed the auditor's actions as "diligent 78 and as requiring more dili-
gence and honesty;79 a subsequent SEC investigation revealed
Seidman's failure to comply with GAAS in its audit.80 Arguably, cor-
porations should be solely responsible for undetected management
fraud in extreme cases. But before refining nuances of incentives for
companies to monitor themselves, the law must ensure that profession-
als hired by the companies for such monitoring fulfill their obligations.
The approach taken by Judge Posner, and the result in Cenco, do not
promote this goal.
Cathy A. Gay
78. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 452.
79. Id at 455.
80. See supra note 75. For examples of the weight given to compliance with professional
standards, see United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1006 (1970)(expert testimony is inconclusive as to compliance with GAAS when testimony dealt
with the accountants' "honest judgment" rather than specific rules); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krek-
stein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(accountants complied with
GAAP but recovery under Rule lOb-5 allowed), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1976); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 658-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(court made no
reference to accounting profession's standards but held as a matter of law that the disputed report
of gain was misleading); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)(court fashions
its own auditing standard); In re Haskins & Sells and Andrew Stewart, SEC Accounting Release
No. 73, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder Accounting Series Releases] FED. SEc. L. R P". (CCH)
72,092, at 62,196 (1952)(SEC uses its own judgment as to what constitutes sound accounting prac-
tice); Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706, 715 (1939)(SEC denies sufficiency of the "usual
practices" followed by accountants as the test of liability although testimony of expert accountants
"relevant and helpful"); Stanley L. Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 45 Misc. 2d 1054, 1057, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501,
506 (Sup. Ct. 1965)(failure to comply with GAAS results in liability under tort or contract
theories).
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